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# SALT III

## Both Carter and Brezhnev are risking much in the upcoming battle over ratification

*This is the first of a five-part series by The Globe's diplomatic correspondent analyzing the issues and implications of the Senate debate on the ratification of SALT II.*

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### EXCERPT:

Both sides agree the pivotal Senate battles probably will be over the following issues:

• **Encryption.** The CIA wanted the White House to push for a total ban on encryption, the encoding of test data radioed back from Russian missiles. Instead the parties agreed only not to encrypt that information necessary to monitor compliance with treaty constraints.

Critics want an amendment calling for a total ban on encryption, insisting that otherwise the burden is on the United States to prove to the Soviets that information being denied is vital to monitoring compliance. The Administration will argue that it has sufficient data on what radio channels the Russians have customarily used on previous missile tests for various kinds of data, and if key channels are suddenly encrypted, the United States would know it and insist that it stop.

• **Loss of CIA Iranian sites.** Two electronic bases in Iran provided important intelligence on the critical launch phase of missile firings from Tyuratam, one of the two most important Soviet ICBM test centers. Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) wants Russia either to permit US spy flights through Soviet air space near test complexes, or to allow the emplacement of unmanned "black boxes," which would allow the US to monitor tests remotely.

The Administration hopes that U2 flights on the Turkish side of the border will suffice, assuming the Russians don't object to them.

• **MX Mobile basing.** When the United States was considering shuttling the MX randomly among several silo-like holes, the Russians insisted this would violate the terms of SALT. Washington felt, however, that it could devise an effective monitoring scheme. The Russians haven't been asked about the trench bas-

guage stating that the treaty is being ratified only with the understanding that the trench system is permitted.

But since the first MX isn't due to become operational until a year after the treaty expires, the argument has more to do with nailing down the issue so it doesn't turn into a big hassle in SALT III.

• **Protocol.** A protocol to the treaty, to expire in 1981, would ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs and of ground-or sea-based cruise missiles. Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) wants a resolution making clear that the protocol cannot be extended beyond that time without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The Administration will not oppose this reservation, but will fight an attempt to kill the protocol outright and expunge it from the treaty.

• **Backfire bomber.** The Administration will strenuously resist an attempt to get Backfire counted as a strategic weapon, arguing that the Russians would never agree, and that this would amount to killing the treaty. Further, officials will point out that there are more than 500 American planes — based in the United States, in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean — all of which have contingency assignments to drop nuclear weapons on Soviet territory. And the United States successfully resisted any of those being counted as strategic weapons.

In addition to wrangling over treaty language, the Senate also will doubtless debate what has been happening to the balance of power during the 10 years of SALT, as well as whether the United States should try to insist that passage of the treaty and extension of Most-Favored-Nation tariffs to the Soviet Union should be linked to Soviet cooperation, rather than confrontation in the Mideast and elsewhere around the world. SALT I was sold partly on the premise of linkage.

A veteran of many national security debates in these terms.